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1 
THIRD-PARTY FUNDING AS EXPLOITATION 
OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY SYSTEM 
FRANK J. GARCIA* 
Abstract: Third-party funding of international investment arbitration is on the 
rise. Through TPF funders will cover the legal fees of investors filing claims 
under investment treaties in exchange for a portion of the arbitral award. Pro-
ponents of third-party funding claim that it provides access to justice for par-
ties that normally would not have the funds to arbitrate against state actors. 
Given that the international investment law that governs these claims is unbal-
anced, and that funding only flows towards investor-claimants, and at the ex-
pense of states and their taxpayers, allowing third-party funding in investment 
arbitration risks creating unjustifiable wealth transfers from the citizens of 
target states for the benefit of speculators. Reform is needed to prevent the 
deleterious effects of third-party funding on developing and newly-
industrialized states and on the investment law regime itself. 
INTRODUCTION 
Third-party litigation funding (“TPF”) is a rapidly expanding industry 
in which speculators invest in a range of legal claims in exchange for a 
measure of control of the case and a contingency in the recovery.1 As re-
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 1 See PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBI-
TRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM 7 (2012) https://
www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjustice.pdf [https://perma.cc/LPC9-7GY2] (noting the 
rapid increase in third-party funding of arbitration claims). TPF has been active in fields as diverse 
as tort law, antitrust, intellectual property, and commercial law, and in class-action cases across a 
range of civil litigation settings. See generally Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third 
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cently as twenty years ago, TPF was illegal throughout the common law as 
a violation of the doctrines of maintenance and champerty, and virtually 
unknown in the civil law world.2 Court decisions in the United Kingdom 
and Australia, however, have initiated a slow but accelerating process of 
legalization that has spread to Europe, the United States, and Asia, raising 
significant policy concerns.3 Proponents of TPF argue that it provides a 
number of benefits across a range of dispute settlement platforms, including 
promoting access to justice and filtering out unmeritorious cases.4 Critics 
argue, on the other hand, that TPF distorts the balance and incentives of tra-
                                                                                                                      
Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011) (describing TPF and the various legal 
fields in which it is used). 
 2 See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1286–91 (discussing the history of maintenance). Maintenance 
is defined as “[i]mproper assistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit given to a litigant by 
someone who has no bona fide interest in the case . . . .” Maintenance, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY (10th ed. 2014). Champerty is defined as “[a]n agreement between an officious intermeddler 
in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as considera-
tion for receiving part of any judgment proceeds . . . .” Champerty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014); accord Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1286–87 (defining champerty and noting that it 
is a form of maintenance); see also Peck v. Heurich, 167 U.S. 624, 630 (1897) (discussing the 
policy reasons behind prohibiting champerty, including the concern that it would “stir up baseless 
litigation”); Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1546 (1996) 
(discussing policy reasons behind the prohibition of champerty including maintaining an incentive 
for settlement, prohibiting corporations from the practice of law, preventing the use of lawsuits to 
harass, and prohibiting a market in the sale of lawsuits). 
 3 See, e.g., Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 336 (Austl.); 
Mobil Oil Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Trendlen Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 ALR 51 (Austl.); Arkin v. Borchard 
Lines Ltd. [2005] EWCA (Civ.) 655 (Eng.); see also JOHN H. BEISNER & GARY A. RUBIN, STOP-
PING THE SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD PARTY INVESTMENTS IN LITI-
GATION 1–2 (2012), https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TPLF_Solutions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ATU6-Z53Y] (discussing policy concerns created by an expansion of TPF); Lisa 
A. Rickard & Mark Behrens, Third-Party Litigation Funding in U.S. Enters Mainstream, Leading 
to Calls for Reform, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2016), https://www.financierworldwide.com/
third-party-litigation-funding-in-us-enters-mainstream-leading-to-calls-for-reform/#.Wz4CNthKjBI. 
[https://perma.cc/H6Q4-FATS] (summarizing the negative reaction to TPF by the American legal 
community). 
 4 INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK 
FORCE ON THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 6, 18–20 (2018) [hereinafter 
ICCA, REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE], https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/
10/40280243154551/icca_reports_4_tpf_final_for_print_5_april.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YNF-7AL6]; 
Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1271–72 (noting the potential for TPF to help provide relief to parties 
who traditionally do not have the resources to access courts); Eric De Brabandere & Julia Lepel-
tak, Third Party Funding in International Investment Arbitration 7 (Grotius Ctr. Working Paper 
Series, Paper No. 2012/1, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2078358 (noting some of the benefits of 
TPF lawsuits). 
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ditional dispute resolution towards speculative gain in the place of justice 
and the orderly settlement of disputes.5 
This Essay focuses exclusively on the role of TPF in disputes arising 
under international investment treaties. The contemporary international law 
regime for protecting foreign investment consists of a large number of bilat-
eral investment treaties (“BITs”) and related investment chapters of free trade 
agreements (“FTAs” or “incorporated BITs”), coupled with a controversial 
arbitration-based investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (“ISDS”).6 If 
an investor considers that an investment rule in a BIT or FTA has been violat-
ed, ISDS provides a mechanism through which relief can be sought directly 
against the host state, with TPF funding now increasingly available for the 
claimant.  
The BIT/ISDS system, however, is widely criticized today on fairness, 
governance, asymmetry, legitimacy, and rule of law grounds, among others.7 
                                                                                                                      
 5 EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 1, at 58–60; BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 3, at 4–6. 
 6 A BIT is an “international agreement[] establishing the terms and conditions for private 
investment by nationals and companies of one state in another state.” Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/bilateral_investment_treaty [https://perma.
cc/TQ5H-AZ3S]. A FTA is “[a]n agreement . . . between two or more countries concerning the 
buying and selling of each country’s goods.” Trade Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). ISDS is a mechanism, authorized by a treaty (either a BIT or FTA) or an investment 
agreement, through which disputes arising under that treaty or agreement may be settled through 
binding arbitration against the host state. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/
press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds [https://perma.cc/EF8H-
97WM].  
 7 See, e.g., JOHN LINARELLI ET AL., THE MISERY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONFRONTA-
TIONS WITH INJUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 147–48 (2018) (discussing the unjust nature of 
international investment law); Lisa Sachs & Lise Johnson, Investment Treaties, Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement, and Inequality: How International Investment Treaties Exacerbate Domestic 
Disparities, in INTERNATIONAL RULES AND INEQUALITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE (José Antonio Ocampo ed., forthcoming 2018) (discussing how international in-
vestment law helps rich countries at the expense of poor countries); Muthucumaraswamy Sornara-
jah, International Investment Law as Development Law: The Obsolescence of a Fraudulent Sys-
tem, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 209, 211–12 (M. Bungen-
berg et al. eds., 2016) (discussing the negative effect of international investment law on develop-
ing countries ); Frank J. Garcia et al., Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons 
from International Trade Law, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 861, 869–73 (2015); Steven Ratner, Interna-
tional Investment Law Through the Lens of Global Justice, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 747, 751–52 
(2017) (summarizing criticisms for current international investment law); Anthea Roberts, Clash 
of Paradigms: Actors and Influences Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 
45, 58–63 (2013) (discussing exploitative relationships that are created under international invest-
ment law); Gus Van Harten et al., Investment Provisions in Trade and Investment Treaties: The Need 
for Reform, BOS. UNIV.-GLOBAL ECON. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE POL’Y BRIEF, Sept. 2015, at 1, 
https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2014/12/Investor-State-Disputes-Policy-Brief.pdf [https://
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This context is essential for properly evaluating the role of TPF in investment. 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the demand by speculators for new in-
vestment vehicles rose, and TPF funders discovered that the political econo-
my of the BIT/ISDS system offered the possibility of very high returns with 
comparatively little risk.8 The structural deficits of the BIT/ISDS regime are 
not irrelevant to the TPF phenomenon, but in fact help drive the TPF funding 
model and make investment arbitration a very attractive investment market.9 
From a public policy perspective, however, these structural deficits, 
together with the nature of TPF investment, mean that TPF in investment 
arbitration could in fact be working as an exploitation of the investment law 
system, respondent states, and their citizens. In fact, as this Essay will ar-
gue, normative political theory strongly suggests that within the current 
BIT/ISDS system, TPF awards constitute unjustifiable wealth transfers from 
respondent host states (frequently, developing countries) and their citizens 
in favor of speculative finance.10 For this reason, if not effectively regulat-
ed, TPF will further compromise not only the public’s faith in the invest-
ment system, but also the viability of the system for states and other stake-
holders such as traditional foreign direct investors. 
Given these risks, states should consider banning TP, at least until the 
international investment regime can be reformed towards more balanced 
agreements. If TPF is to be allowed at all, it must, at a minimum, be strong-
ly regulated to limit some of its damaging effects. Current developments, 
however, are moving in the opposite direction, facilitating increased use of 
TPF and therefore intensifying the exploitation.11 If we are to move against 
                                                                                                                      
perma.cc/9B3Q-8HHD] (discussing the exploitation that exists under current international invest-
ment law). 
 8 See Rebecca Lowe, Investment Arbitration Claims Could Be ‘Traded Like Derivatives,’ 
INT’L BAR ASS’N (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=02
decc8d-bf67-4b86-a023-f2ef2aa4843b [https://perma.cc/3CXW-ZJ32] (discussing the use of TPF 
as an investment opportunity). 
 9 RSM Prod. Corp. v. St. Lucia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10, Decision on Saint Lucia’s Re-
quest for Security for Costs, ¶ 13 (Aug. 13, 2014) (Griffith, Q.C., Assenting Opinion). One arbi-
trator went so far as to characterize the international investment arbitration market for third-party 
funders as a “gambler’s paradise: heads I win, tails I do not lose.” Id. 
 10 See EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 1, at 15–16 (noting the cost to Bulgaria of a TPF 
claim). 
 11 For example, Hong Kong and Singapore have recently passed legislation explicitly allow-
ing TPF in ISDS. Melody Chan, Hong Kong, in THE THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING LAW 
REVIEW 78, 78 (Leslie Perrin ed., 2017); Matthew Secomb & Adam Wallin, Singapore, in THE 
THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING LAW REVIEW 125, 126–29. Moreover, a 2018 industry self-
study which largely whitewashes TPF in the BIT/ISDS system promises to only intensify this 
trend. See generally ICCA, REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE, supra note 4. 
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TPF, and maintain the integrity of the investment treaty law system, the 
time to act is now. 
I. HOW TPF WORKS 
In order to understand how TPF can be characterized as an exploitation 
of the investment regime, it is first necessary to understand something of how 
TPF operates in an international setting, as a new element in the BIT/ISDS 
regime. 
A. The TPF Funding Model 
In the arbitration context, TPF is a specialized form of dispute financ-
ing in which a third-party finances the costs of arbitral proceedings for a 
party in a dispute that is subject to arbitration under a treaty-based ISDS 
provision.12 In return, the funder requires some degree of control over the 
case and receives a percentage of the awarded compensation if the claim is 
successful.13 If the claim fails, the funder receives no compensation and will 
bear the fees due to the claimant’s legal team as well as other adverse 
costs.14 The TPF industry is dominated by specialized litigation finance 
firms (such as Juridica in the United Kingdom, Burford Capital in the Unit-
ed States, and Omni Bridgeway in the Netherlands), investment banks, and 
hedge funds, all of whom raise their TPF capital from private investors 
seeking speculative portfolio investment opportunities.15 Although the bulk 
of TPF funding goes towards domestic civil litigation, funders have report-
ed that over ten percent of their investments are made in both international 
investment arbitrations and international commercial arbitrations.16 
Investment arbitration claims have proven especially attractive to 
third-party funders because the amount of compensation resulting from 
                                                                                                                      
 12 De Brabandere & Lepeltak, supra note 4, at 5. Outside of a treaty or private investment 
agreement, there is no right to arbitrate against a state on the part of a private investor. 
 13 See id. at 5, 7 (summarizing the concept of TPF). Many funders exert control over the 
case/client by monitoring legal fees and requiring progress reports of the case, demanding the 
right to approve the claimant’s expenditures, having the choice of arbitrator, receiving updates of 
the case with any significant developments, and having direct access to the client’s attorneys. 
ICCA, REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 28. 
 14 Ronen Perry, Crowdfunding Civil Justice, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1357, 1365 (2018); De Bra-
bandere & Lepeltak, supra note 4, at 5. 
 15 Catherine A. Rogers, Gamblers, Loan Sharks & Third-Party Funders, in ETHICS IN INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION 177, 178–79 (2014); see EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 1, at 57 
tbl.3 (listing well-known investment firms that engage in TPF of lawsuits). 
 16 Rogers, supra note 15, at 182 n.33. 
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such claims often far exceeds the compensation awarded in commercial 
arbitration, and investment treaty law offers virtually no counterclaim or 
offset possibilities for respondent states, thus making such claims very lu-
crative for funders.17 Indeed, the size of the claim and costs associated with 
investment arbitrations can be enormous, often exceeding hundreds of mil-
lions of U.S. dollars, and the returns on such investments can be equally as 
staggering.18 These returns range from 30 to 50% on a portfolio basis, with 
outcomes in specific cases even higher.19 An example of this was recently 
reported by Burford Capital, which in 2017 realized a 736% return on its 
investment following the sale of its interest in an investment arbitration 
claim in Teinver v. Argentina.20 
TPF in an ISDS claim offers a significant upside to investor-claimants as 
well, because TPF minimizes the financial risk of bringing a claim against a 
host-state by shifting some or all of the cost-burdens to the funder.21 Third-
party funders can—in theory—also provide support to the respondent states 
against whom the claims are brought. In reality, however, the overwhelming 
majority of funding goes to investor-claimants because states cannot recover 
financially through ISDS, thus offering no corresponding “upside potential” 
for TPF investors in funding states.22  
                                                                                                                      
 17 See Rogers, supra note 15, at 178–79 (noting the significant opportunity present for funders in 
international arbitration); COLUM. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE INV., THIRD PARTY FUNDING IN INVES-
TOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION ON THIRD PARTY FUNDING IN IN-
VESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT WITH ICCA/QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE ON THIRD-PARTY 
FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION DRAFT REPORT FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION 1 (2017) 
[hereinafter ROUND TABLE], http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/11/Third-Party-Funding-in-ISDS-
Roundtable-Outcome-Document-FINAL-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU5Y-SDP7] (noting that only 
claimants may file counterclaims, not states).  
 18 Willem H. Van Boom, Third-Party Financing in  International Investment Arbi-
trat ion  30 (Apr. 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/
SSRN_ID2043713_code342508.pdf?abstractid=2027114&mirid=1&type=2; see BURFORD CAPI-
TAL, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2017), http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/
03/BUR-28711-Annual-Report-2017-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC4R-9LBX] (noting, for exam-
ple, the sale of a claim worth $325 million). 
 19 Van Boom, supra note 18, at 30. 
 20 Id. An appeal is currently pending in the 2017 case Teinver v. Argentina in the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, following an arbitration tribunal award in excess of 
$325 million. Id. at 23. Burford Capital invested approximately $13 million in the matter and sold 
their interest on the secondary market for $107 million for a gain of $94.2 million. Id. 
 21 EBERHARD & OLIVET, supra note 1, at 59 (noting that “a corporation can file a claim then 
pass the cash drain and the risk to a funder while waiting for a payout, making arbitration against 
states even more attractive for businesses”). 
 22 See id. at 7 (noting the greater financial upside for plaintiff side funding); see also Frank J. 
Garcia et al., The Case Against Third-Party Funding in ISDS: Executive Summary 6 (B.C. L. Sch. – 
PUC Univ. of Chile, Working Grp. on Trade & Inv. Law Reform, Third-Party Funding Task Force 
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When deciding whether to enter into a funding agreement with a claim-
ant, third-party funders conduct extensive due diligence and weigh several 
considerations. One significant consideration is, of course, the merit of a 
claim.23 Investment arbitration offers a unique advantage to potential funders 
insofar as the majority of ISDS arbitral awards are published.24 This decreas-
es uncertainty surrounding their litigation investment and allows funders to 
more easily determine the likelihood that a case will prevail when evaluated 
against the background of trends in arbitral interpretations of key BIT provi-
sions.25 
A second major consideration is the enforceability of the award against 
the host-state.26 Third-party funders are less likely to invest in cases they 
know will be unenforceable or difficult to enforce against the host-state.27 By 
way of example, arbitrations brought under the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID 
Convention”) are particularly attractive to third party funders due to the ease 
of recognizing and enforcing the award in the host-state under the ICSID 
Convention.28 
Finally, in deciding whether to finance a claimant, funders also weigh 
the value of the compensation sought, the extent of anticipated legal costs, 
and the expertise of the legal team that they will be funding.29 In particular, 
TPF funders have reported considering the level of development, expertise, 
and legal capacity of the target state, with preference given to claims against 
developing or newly industrialized states with both a capacity to pay the 
                                                                                                                      
2018), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2130&context=lsfp [https://
perma.cc/BP8T-499U] (discussing the unbalanced TPF provided to plaintiffs compared to defend-
ant-states in arbitration cases). In the few reported cases of third-party funders supporting re-
spondent states, the funder often sought a share of funds recovered by the funded states in other 
disputes not related to the funded investment dispute or indeed the investment system generally. 
Interview with Lise Johnson, Head of Inv. Law and Policy, Colum. Ctr. on Sustainable Inv. (Apr. 
23, 2018). 
 23 De Brabandere & Lepeltak, supra note 4, at 5. 
 24 Id. at 6–7. 
 25 Id. These trends have in fact expanded the scope of key investment rules, making it even 
more likely for investment claims to succeed against states, hence making such claims even more 
attractive to TPF funders. 
 26 Id. at 5. 
 27 Id. at 10. 
 28 Id. Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention imposes an obligation on all states party to the 
ICSID Convention to enforce the award “as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State” 
with no review by national courts of that State. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes between States and Nationals of Other States art. 54(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159. 
 29 De Brabandere & Lepeltak, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
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award and a respectable investment rating they are eager to protect, while 
having only modest legal capacity and legal defense budgets.30 
B. TPF in the BIT/ISDS System 
TPF cannot be fully evaluated without reference to larger structural 
and institutional questions in investment law and to the fairness of the glob-
al economic system as a whole. The current BIT/ISDS system is undergoing 
an historic level of criticism and calls for reform, a larger process within 
which the current TPF critique forms a part.31 Even proponents of the cur-
rent BIT/ISDS regime recognize the system’s flaws with respect to tradi-
tional rule of law desiderata such as transparency, predictability, coherence, 
and accountability.32 Moreover, there is growing concern among scholars, 
civil society, and even some within the investment community that bilateral 
investment treaties and ISDS, in their current form, are no longer justifiable, 
even granting arguendo that they may have been when invented. Critics ar-
gue that the current BIT-based international investment regime is funda-
mentally unbalanced in terms of norms and dispute resolution, offering in-
vestors a wide range of protections while offering states no meaningful ba-
sis for claims or counterclaims.33 Indeed, this imbalance has recently been 
referred to as “The Great Asymmetry” in international investment law to-
day.34 
Even granting that there may have been valid historical reasons for this 
asymmetry in the post-colonial period, and that risks to the viability and 
security of foreign investment continue to be real, in the view of this author 
the asymmetry nevertheless represents a fundamental flaw in the investment 
                                                                                                                      
 30 See ROUND TABLE, supra note 17, at 7–8 (discussing the criteria used by investors to de-
cide whether to invest in claims). 
 31 See, e.g., Linarelli, supra note 7, at 147–48 (criticizing TPF as unjust); Sachs & Johnson, 
supra note 7 (discussing how international investment law helps rich countries at the expense of 
poor countries); Roberts, supra note 7 (discussing exploitative relationships that are created under 
international investment law). 
 32 See, e.g., EBERHARD & OLIVET, supra note 1 (detailing economic issues found in TPF); 
Rogers, supra note 15 (calling for increased regulation of TPF); Van Boom, supra note 18 (calling 
for increased transparency in TPF). 
 33 See, e.g., EBERHARD & OLIVET, supra note 1; Rogers, supra note 15; Van Boom, supra 
note 18. 
 34 See generally Alessandra Arcuri, The Great Asymmetry and the Rule of Law in Trade and 
Investment Agreements, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY (forth-
coming 2019) (discussing asymmetrical relationships which are created under many international 
investment treaties). 
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regime.35 The BIT/ISDS regime today is deficient from the perspective of 
both governance and fairness, two parameters critical to shaping a more 
effective investment law regime for the 21st century. The regime presents a 
governance issue because the investment treaty regime can no longer simp-
ly be considered as treaties granting private parties legal rights.36 Global 
governance today expects that regulatory structures and decisions that affect 
a range of transnational and national stakeholders (including investors) be 
made according to norms of participation, accountability, transparency, due 
process, and the rule of law.37 In these respects, the current international 
investment regime is lacking. 
Moreover, this asymmetry means the investment system is unfair in its 
distributive effects. Given that investment law is an allocative social institu-
tion,38 we must evaluate the investment regime according to the same fair-
ness norms we would apply to any system of governance allocating eco-
nomic rights and resources across a range of settings.39 The BIT/ISDS sys-
tem fails to take into account its distributive effects on a range of stakehold-
ers other than investors, the only stakeholder whose concerns are effectively 
recognized.40 Ensuring a secure return on investment is fair, but this does 
not exhaust what fairness requires of investment law. 
Into this drama of doctrinal, procedural, governance, and fairness con-
cerns, TPF enters the scene. As will be argued below, TPF exacerbates the 
unfair effects of the BIT/ISDS system by exploiting the system’s weakness-
es in ways that further undercut the regime’s capacity to satisfy even basic 
norms of distributive justice. 
                                                                                                                      
 35 See, e.g., Garcia et al., supra note 7, 869–73 (discussing historical causes for, and contem-
porary effects of, the asymmetrical nature of international investment regime). 
 36 See id. at 871; Roberts, supra note 7, at 65. 
 37 See EMMA AISBETT ET AL., RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE: 
PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 17 (2018) (discussing how the international investment law 
system should take into account certain principles). 
 38 Garcia et al., supra note 7, at 876. 
 39 See Ratner, supra note 7, at 768; see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 438–39 (1998) (discussing the role of fairness in international 
investment law). See generally FRANK J. GARCIA, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECO-
NOMIC LAW: THREE TAKES (2013) (discussing the standards of fairness that apply to international 
investment law). 
 40 Sachs & Johnson, supra note 7, at 15. See generally Garcia et al., supra note 7 (discussing 
the asymmetry found in investment treaties); Ratner, supra note 7 (discussing the unbalanced 
nature of the BIT/ISDS system). 
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II. THIRD-PARTY FUNDING AS ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION 
Despite the claims of its advocates and the possibility that impecunious 
investor-claimants could, in principle, be helped (counterarguments which 
will be addressed below), it is the view of this author that on the whole third-
party funding in a legal system as unbalanced as the investment regime works 
as an exploitation of the system’s flaws, to the detriment of stakeholders and 
for the benefit of speculative financiers. It does so by taking advantage of the 
system’s weaknesses to effect what amount to unjustified wealth transfers 
from the citizens and taxpayers of target states and into the hands of specula-
tive finance, a class of beneficiary the BIT/ISDS system never intended. 
To recognize the risks posed by TPF, however, one need not adhere to 
a fundamental premise of this Essay, namely that the BIT/ISDS system to-
day is fundamentally flawed. Even if one is of the view that the current 
BIT/ISDS system is appropriately designed for the protection of foreign 
direct investment, there are still important reasons for concern over TPF’s 
systemic effects. By opening the system to the resources (and priorities) of 
speculative investment, TPF risks intensifying the criticism and controversy 
surrounding an already-embattled system and overheating the system 
through an increase in the number of claims, thus undermining the benefits 
traditional investors have come to expect from the BIT/ISDS system, all for 
the benefit of speculative finance.41 
A. TPF Is an Exploitation of an Unbalanced System 
Under normative political theory, in order for TPF to qualify as an ex-
ploitation, it must constitute an “unfair advantage-taking” of flaws in the 
structure and operation of the BIT/ISDS system to the detriment of other 
participants. After first explaining the nature of exploitation, I will then set 
out in what ways TPF takes advantage of the investment regime’s flaws, 
and how that advantage-taking is unfair. 
1. Economic Exploitation as Unfair Advantage-Taking 
Theorists offer a number of accounts of what renders an economic ar-
rangement exploitative.42 What the various accounts share in common is the 
notion of unfair advantage-taking.43 
                                                                                                                      
 41 See infra notes 43–72 and accompanying text. 
 42 See, e.g., Mathias Risse & Gabriel Wollner, Three Images of Trade: On the Place of Trade 
in a Theory of Global Justice, 1 MORAL PHIL. & POL. 201, 214 (2014) (defining exploitation); 
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Unfair advantage-taking occurs when there is a flaw in the circumstanc-
es of the transaction, what Risse and Wollner call a “moral defect” in a distri-
bution and its history.44 This flaw might be an injustice in background condi-
tions, a vulnerability,45 a rights violation, or some other form of disabling dis-
respect.46 Whatever its nature, the flaw operates in a specific socio-economic 
context between parties to result in one party accepting—seemingly inexpli-
cably—a bargain that is not fair, though with no evidence of direct coer-
cion.47 We characterize the party benefitting from the flaw as exploiting the 
situation, and the vulnerable party as the exploited party. 
2. Why TPF in ISDS Is an Exploitation of States Through the BIT Regime 
TPF is an exploitation because in the context of the current BIT/ISDS 
system it constitutes a case of unfair advantage-taking. TPF funders are in-
tentionally targeting the BIT/ISDS system as a speculative investment vehi-
cle due to its unique structural characteristics.48 They are doing this in order 
to achieve wealth transfers—in the form of TPF-funded settlements or arbi-
tral awards—which represent unjustifiable transfers from target states and 
their citizens. 
a. TPF Takes Advantage of the BIT/ISDS Regime by Design  
That TPF is a case of intentional advantage-taking of the BIT/ISDS 
regime can hardly be denied. By funders’ own account, TPF involvement in 
ISDS is predicated on precisely those aspects of the system that are most 
subject to criticism today. 
To begin with, there is the basic structure of the ISDS system. TPF 
funders fully recognize that under BITs, states have no substantive rights 
                                                                                                                      
Matt Zwolinski, Structural Exploitation, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 154, 156–57 (2012) (explaining 
exploitation in the context of economic arrangements). 
 43 Risse & Wollner, supra note 42, at 214; Zwolinski, supra note 42, at 156–57. See generally 
ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION (1996) (explaining exploitation as a situation where one 
party takes advantage of another party). 
 44 Risse & Wollner, supra note 42, at 215. 
 45 Vulnerability is a useful term to describe a situation that makes one ripe for exploitation, 
whether an individual or a state. 
 46 See Robert E. Goodin, Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person, in MODERN THEO-
RIES OF EXPLOITATION 166, 166–71 (Andrew Reeve ed., 1987) (explaining exploitation as a situa-
tion where one party takes advantage of another party). 
 47 See Zwolinski, supra note 42, at 158–61(proposing that we consider exploitation in terms 
of fairness and injustice on a micro and macro level). 
 48 See EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 1 at 58–59 (discussing different types of exploita-
tion). 
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and therefore cannot assert counterclaims or offsets which would jeopardize 
or reduce any recovery. Moreover, ISDS gives claimants a direct voice in 
the selection of adjudicators and arbitration rules, allowing TPF funders a 
degree of influence over the tribunal that is unthinkable in domestic civil 
litigation. Finally, the awards are unappealable and legally binding, and the 
global investment market makes ignoring an arbitral award a very risky 
course of conduct for any responding state concerned with its investment 
rating.49 
Jurisprudential trends in investment arbitration also make conditions 
better for TPF and worse for states. Current expansive trends in arbitral in-
terpretation of key BIT doctrines such as fair and equitable treatment 
(“FET”) favorably alter the TPF risk calculus, making it more likely that 
states will face an increasing number of ISDS claims and an eroding legal 
basis for defending against those claims.50 The positive effects of these 
trends for TPF, and the negative effects for states, are magnified in a system 
that allows losing states no right of appeal, meaning that there is no coher-
ent system for addressing jurisprudential outliers and moderating at an ap-
pellate level interpretive approaches taken at the tribunal level. 
The investment portfolio model of TPF that is fast becoming the norm 
also means that claimants will be incentivized to take more chances with 
weaker and riskier claims, contrary to what TPF proponents claim. The 
costs of losing (spread over the portfolio) are low relative to the possible 
gains from either settling or in fact prevailing on a novel theory in that arbi-
tration and, potentially, an even more lucrative one in the future.  
Thus, in an already unbalanced system, funders confer additional ad-
vantages on investors (advancing at the same time their own interests) in a 
growing number of claims against responding states with limited substantive 
rights and no appellate rights. This is an additional challenge for states that 
are already burdened by competing sovereign budgetary responsibilities to 
many stakeholders and that hold an attractive monopoly on the taxing power. 
b. TPF Advantage-Taking is Unfair 
But is this advantage-taking unfair? In the view of this author, it is, and 
resoundingly so. First, TPF represents a threat to fairness because it increas-
es the resources available in a dispute to an already privileged class of in-
                                                                                                                      
 49 Id. at 56–61. 
 50 See generally Sebastián López Escarena, Investment Disputes Oltre Lo Stato. On Global 
Administrative Law, and Fair and Equitable Treatment, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (dis-
cussing the doctrine of fair and equitable treatment). 
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vestor-claimants, to the detriment of other stakeholders who are not granted 
similar benefits and will bear the additional costs. TPF thus gives a small 
class of investors even more resources to prosecute an increasing number of 
claims against constrained states in (to the author’s eye) an already unbal-
anced system. Moreover, it introduces a new class of beneficiaries, TPF 
funders, who were not originally intended as beneficiaries and yet who will 
profit from this system to the tune of somewhere between 30 and 50% of 
any settlement or award.  
 Second, this advantage comes at a significant cost to target countries 
and their citizens. It has been estimated to cost states an average of $8 to 
$10 million dollars to defend against a claim, even a spurious one.51 More-
over, states either lose or settle two-thirds of all investment disputes, adding 
settlement or judgement costs to these litigation costs.52 The scale of impact 
of these costs can be appreciated from a number of interacting factors: the 
upwardly-trending size of arbitral awards (recently averaging approximate-
ly $522 million per dispute),53 the share of these awards that goes to TPF 
(estimated at 30 to50% although precise data is hard to come by due to se-
crecy),54 and the increase in TPF-funded ISDS claims filed, part of the gen-
eral increase in investment claims.55 
                                                                                                                      
 51 U.N. Gen. Assembly, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fourth Session (Vienna, 27 Nov.–1 Dec. 2017), Comm’n on 
Int’l Trade Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930 (2017). 
 52 UNCTAD, Recent Trends in IIAS and ISDS, IIA ISSUES NOTE NO. 1, Feb., 2015, at 7, https://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5B6-X9FX] (noting 
that funders win in 37% of cases and settle in 28% of cases). 
 53 UNCTAD, Special Update on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures, IIA 
ISSUES NOTE NO. 3, Nov. 2017, at 1, 5, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MWW-KYP3] (noting an average of $522 million awarded per success-
ful claimant).  
 54 Van Boom, supra note 18, at 30 (noting that investors generally receive between 30–50% 
of the arbitration award). 
 55 Although data on the extent of TPF in the BIT/ISDS system is hard to come by, in domestic 
litigation Australia, for example, saw an estimated 16.5% increase in claims filed after relaxing its 
TPF prohibitions. Moreover, a 2015 survey of investment lawyers by Queen Mary Law School 
found that 39% of respondents had encountered TPF in practice. See James Egerton Vernon, Taming 
the “Mercantile Adventurers”: Third Party Funding and Investment Arbitration—A Report from the 
14th Annual ITA-ASIL Conference, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (2017), http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2017/04/21/taming-the-mercantile-adventurers-third-party-funding-and-in
vestment-arbitration-a-report-from-the-14th-annual-ita-asil-conference/ [https://perma.cc/EHD7-
FMVT] (citing to the 2015 Queen Mary/White & Case International Arbitration Survey); 
Tara Santosuosso & Randall Scarlett, Essay, Third-Party Funding in Investment Arbitration: Mis-
appropriation of Access to Justice Rhetoric by Global Speculative Finance, 60 B.C. L. REV. E. 
SUPP. (forthcoming 2019), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ljawps/8/ (discussing flaws in the 
“access to justice” argument in favor of TPF). 
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What is even worse from a fairness point of view is that these settle-
ments and awards will ultimately be paid by a large class of stakeholders 
underrepresented in the current system: the respondent state’s public, who 
as taxpayers and citizens are the “residual risk-bearers” in the current sys-
tem. The public pays in the form of both fiscal and welfare burdens because 
losses and settlements must (1) be paid out of the public fisc, with (2) mon-
ey that is therefore no longer available for social welfare or other govern-
ment spending priorities.56 This is markedly different from the equities of 
domestic TPF litigation between commercial parties, where the costs of los-
ing the case are borne by a commercial entity and its shareholders. 
c. TPF in ISDS Results in Unjustified Wealth Transfers 
For all these reasons, a settlement or arbitral award in a TPF-funded 
case can be understood as an unjustified wealth transfer. One can justify, at 
least in principle, an award or settlement paid to a traditional ISDS claimant 
on the basis of the larger “social contract of investment” between the inves-
tor, the host country and its stakeholders. In that contract, the original inves-
tor put its capital at risk and to work in the host country, offering develop-
ment benefits in exchange for investment returns and a degree of legal pro-
tection. On the contrary, TPF funders are not parties to this social contract 
and TPF “investment” is purely speculative, at no time offering even the 
possibility of any development benefits to the host country that might miti-
gate the equities of any subsequent arbitration-based transfers.  
This would be morally problematic even in cases where the respondent 
state is wealthy (should TPF funders decide to come after such states, which 
is unlikely), but it is particularly egregious (and sadly more frequent) when 
the transfers come from the citizens of developing and newly industrialized 
states, as they are likely to do, given that TPF funders have admitted taking 
development status into account in their preliminary evaluation of a poten-
tial claim/investment.57 Such states are particularly vulnerable to TPF, given 
that the vast majority (88%) of all claimant investors are from high-income 
countries, and developing countries successfully defeat investment claims 
only about half as often as developed countries do.58 
                                                                                                                      
 56 Moreover, regulatory settlements (for example, waivers of environmental law require-
ments) can impose negative externalities on the public as well. 
 57 ROUND TABLE, supra note 17. 
 58 Thomas Schultz & Cédric Dupont, Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or 
Over-Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1147, 1154, 
1266–67 (2015). 
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For all these reasons, such transfers (in the form of TPF-funded awards) 
should be considered as prima facie unjustified—in fact, they appear to turn 
generally accepted norms of fairness upside down, amounting to an uncom-
pensated taking from the less-favored many for the benefit of the wealthy 
few, with no compensating social justification.59 Unless TPF advocates can 
justify such transfers, allowing speculative finance a stake in the outcome of 
ISDS claims, a voice in the determination of which cases to bring, which ar-
bitrators to choose, and which cases to settle amounts to nothing less than a 
deliberate exploitation of the flaws in the BIT system for the benefit of specu-
lators and at the cost of already-burdened respondent states, their taxpayers, 
and citizens. It is to those justificatory efforts that we now turn. 
B. ISDS Wealth Transfers to TPF Funders Cannot Be Justified  
Attempts by TPF proponents to justify the role of TPF in ISDS offer 
three kinds of arguments in its defense. First, even conceding some TPF-
related costs, TPF proponents argue that such costs are justifiable given the 
need to increase access to justice. Second, they argue that, given the fact that 
the claimant remains in all cases the original productive investor, the claim-
ant’s choice of financing mechanisms is irrelevant to the underlying equities 
of the situation. Finally, TPF advocates could claim that the availability of 
litigation finance in investment arbitration could lead to an increase in pro-
ductive investment, if potential investors know they need not face alone the 
high costs of vindicating their rights under the treaties in any future arbitra-
tions. All three rationales, however, fail to adequately justify this practice. 
1. TPF Is Not About Access to Justice 
Proponents of TPF in ISDS have drawn justification from traditional 
TPF rationales, arguing that funding of investment claims provides access 
to justice for investors who wish to seek redress but lack sufficient financial 
resources. This is a view favored by funders, as it frames their role as a vital 
one, which facilitates and contributes to global economic justice.60 In the 
ISDS context, however, this rationale is fundamentally flawed—the role of 
                                                                                                                      
 59 Ironically, they also run counter to basic investment rules against expropriation, in that they 
serve no public purpose and offer no compensation to the burdened. 
 60 See Kelsie Massini, Risk Versus Reward: The Increasing Use of Third Party Funders in 
International Arbitration and the Awarding of Security for Costs, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 323, 
325 (2015) (discussing reforms to TPF in international investment law). 
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TPF in the ISDS system cannot be equated with providing financing for 
disadvantaged claimants.61 
Traditionally access to justice has meant capacity-building for social 
justice, or, in other words, providing financing or other support for parties 
who lack the human and financial resources to litigate. In contrast, as TPF 
funders readily and publicly acknowledge, TPF in ISDS is primarily about 
balance-sheet management, offering well-resourced claimants the ability to 
minimize the risk associated with bringing a claim, and does not focus on 
providing funding to impecunious or disadvantaged claimants.62 
In fact, when one considers access to justice in its broadest social con-
text, TPF actually risks impairing access to justice for developing respondent 
states and their citizens. TPF funding exacerbates the inherent imbalance in 
the BIT system, disproportionately affecting already disadvantaged states’ 
ability to control regulatory change within their borders and deliver important 
social welfare benefits. TPF further shifts power and resources towards pri-
vate investors, which can in turn negatively impact the political affairs and 
social welfare of developing nations by sapping their resources.63 
2. TPF Does in Fact Alter the Equities of Investment Arbitration 
 It could be argued that, at least formally speaking, the presence of TPF 
in ISDS arbitration does not change the identity of the claimant, nor the fact 
                                                                                                                      
 61 See Santosuosso & Scarlett, supra note 55 (arguing that “it seems morally objectionable to 
allow speculation in the context of ISDS, where outcomes can result in devastating economic 
implications for developing nations, even if in limited circumstances a claimant actually is impe-
cunious and thereby granted access to justice through the involvement of a funder”). 
 62 Id. In fact, in the words of a leading TPF funder:  
Much of the focus of the litigation finance market today is on the growing corporate 
utilization of funding by large, well-resourced entities, who are looking for ways to 
manage risk, reduce legal budgets or take the cost of pursuing arbitration off-balance 
sheet, or other business reasons for not wanting to allocate resources to financing an 
arbitration matter.  
Christopher P. Bogart, Third-Party Financing of International Arbitration Global Arbitration Re-
view, GAR (Oct. 14, 2016), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/the-european-arbitration-
review-2017/1069316/third-partyfinancing-of-international-arbitration [https://perma.cc/DB4W-
73TX]. Christopher Bogart is the co-founder and CEO of Burford Capital. Christopher Bogart, BUR-
FORD CAPITAL, http://www.burfordcapital.com/directory/christopher-p-bogart/ [https://perma.cc/
9VMB-GCLV]. 
 63 Public health, public safety, and environmental protection measures have all been chal-
lenged under the BIT/ISDS system and developing states cannot weather the burden to public 
finances that even non-public welfare arbitration claims will create when paid out of public fi-
nances. See EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing the negative impact of invest-
ment arbitration on developing nations). 
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that in principle the entire award goes to the claimant. In that sense, how the 
claimant has decided to fund its claim and allocate the award (or settlement) 
should not affect the underlying equities of ISDS arbitration. Investors file 
claims, arbitrators adjudicate them, and, if the claim is successful, states pay 
them—business as usual. 
 TPF does not mean business as usual, however, but quite the opposite. 
The role of TPF funders in case management decisions means that the goals 
and interests of speculative finance—maximizing return on investment in a 
context (a system to facilitate long-term productive investment) in which 
TPF funders as speculators are not repeat players—may take the place of 
the goals and interests of a traditional claimant who must balance settlement 
value against the risks, costs (to their own funds), and possible returns of 
litigation in the context of a possibly ongoing business relationship.64 This 
is precisely the risk that common law notions of maintenance and champer-
ty were intended to prevent. 
 To this must be added the systemic effects of TPF investment, with 
available (though limited) evidence suggesting that TPF is both increasing 
the number of claims filed and increasing the likelihood that weaker claims 
will be pursued.65 Both trends increase the burden on already-burdened 
states to defend against or settle such claims, while undercutting the justifi-
cation for this. 
 Finally, there are the differences in the political economy of ISDS arbi-
tration when compared with the civil litigation and commercial arbitration 
environments TPF originally came from. The underlying asymmetry of 
BITs—the fact that under BIT rules, only states face the risk of large dam-
age payments versus private litigants in any TPF-funded commercial litiga-
tion or arbitration—means that TPF changes the game unilaterally for states 
in a way it does not for commercial parties.  
 Finally, the fact that in ISDS arbitration the residual risk bearers for the 
losing states are citizens and taxpayers, not the shareholders of private enter-
prise, means that the investor’s decision about funding does affect the equities 
in that it affects the source of TPF returns on investment. We should be con-
cerned when states and their citizens, not other shareholders, bear the brunt of 
TPF wealth-maximization. 
                                                                                                                      
 64 This risk is heightened by the fact that conflicts rules for TPF funders, investors and their 
counsel are unclear, and relationships among TPF funders, investors’ counsel and even arbitrators 
are complex and murky. See ROUND TABLE, supra note 17 (discussing possible reforms to the 
TPF system). 
 65 EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 1, at 7. 
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3. There Is No Evidence That the Availability of TPF Promotes Foreign 
Direct Investment  
If the availability of TPF funding could be shown to promote an in-
crease in foreign direct investment (“FDI”) flows because it reduced a po-
tential investor’s future legal costs, this could offer justification for the pub-
lic and systemic costs of TPF. There is no evidence, however, suggesting 
that the availability of TPF would in fact increase the amount of FDI, the 
only compensating factor that could potentially be of benefit to states and 
their citizens.  
Given the secrecy surrounding TPF in ISDS, it is difficult to determine 
with precision the extent to which TPF is involved in ISDS, making it im-
possible to determine if any increases in FDI would be TPF-related. Availa-
ble evidence suggests that it is unlikely that TPF would have such an in-
vestment-promoting effect. To begin with, the economic data on the role of 
BITs in increasing FDI is inconclusive.66 It seems likely that if BITs have no 
clear effect on FDI, then the availability of litigation funding would have 
even less effect. Moreover, there is a recent study suggesting that even pro-
investor reforms to the provisions of investment agreements similarly have 
no clear incentivizing effect on FDI.67  
Instead, what seems clear (but again, on survey and anecdotal evidence 
only), is that the number of disputes against states is increasing, which by 
itself offers no benefit whatsoever to states or their citizens.68 Insofar as the 
availability of TPF is a factor promoting this increase, the social justifica-
tion for TPF in ISDS only gets weaker. 
C. Even the Regime’s Defenders Should Fear TPF 
It is a fundamental premise of this argument that the current BIT/ISDS 
system is flawed and that TPF funders take advantage of these flaws to the 
detriment of traditional stakeholders. Proponents of the ISDS system as cur-
rently constituted should also recognize, however, that opening the ISDS sys-
tem to TPF is unwise for anyone relying on the system’s long-term survival. 
                                                                                                                      
 66 See AISBETT ET AL., supra note 37, at 35–51(noting the increased use of TPF in interna-
tional arbitration venues). 
 67 See Cree Jones, Do Legal Remedies Promote Investment? New Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment in the Investment Treaty Network (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3204964 (discussing the effect of international legal remedies on TPF invest-
ments). 
 68 EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 1, at 8 (noting the large increase in investor-state arbi-
tration). 
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Whether or not one considers the many critiques of the BIT/ISDS sys-
tem to be valid, it is clear that together they create a legitimacy crisis for the 
regime. Not only are many states, stakeholders, academics, and civil society 
organizations highly critical of the regime, but there have also been recent 
high-profile exits from the regime, and significant changes in policy on the 
part of a number of states that span the development spectrum.69 
In this environment, the growing role of TPF in ISDS risks further 
overheating ISDS to the point of collapse, giving resentful states additional 
reasons—and excellent public relations talking points—for exiting the re-
gime. This may not be in the long-term interest of traditional FDI investors, 
insofar as they are counting on the long-term viability of ISDS for the pro-
tection of their traditional—and legitimate—investment interests.70 For sim-
ilar reasons, business and commercial interests in the United States of 
America have, through the Chamber of Commerce, resisted the rise of do-
mestic TPF-funded litigation as inimical to the long-term health of the civil 
litigation and arbitration systems its business membership depends on.71 
TPF thus creates risks that threaten the long-term viability of ISDS and 
the current international investment regime. Allowing TPF to skew the 
BIT/ISDS system into a facilitation mechanism for controversial wealth 
transfers for the benefit of speculators hurts everyone else, including tradi-
tional stakeholders such as FDI investors. 
III. ADDRESSING THIRD-PARTY FUNDING AS EXPLOITATION THROUGH 
LAW REFORM 
As an exploitative mechanism for unjustified wealth transfers, TPF 
should be barred from all ISDS cases until the system is fundamentally re-
formed both substantively and procedurally. At present, however, the TPF 
industry is in the midst of an aggressive worldwide lobbying campaign to 
                                                                                                                      
 69 See The Arbitration Game, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), https://www.economist.com/
finance-and-economics/2014/10/11/the-arbitration-game [https://perma.cc/4EE6-X428] (noting 
that the United States, Australia, India, South Africa, and Ecuador, for example, have all exited or 
are renegotiating their ISDS commitments). Id. Canada must now also be added to this list. 
Heather Gies, NAFTA Out, USMCA In: What’s in the Canada, Mexico, US Trade Deal?, AL 
JAZEERA (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/nafta-usmca-canada-mexico-
trade-deal-181001195545440.html [https://perma.cc/HT59-8PBM]. 
 70 Industries making capital-intensive long-term investments, such as the automotive and 
automotive parts industries, view any threat to the stability of ISDS as inimical to their interests, 
including threats from the backlash to TPF’s effects. See Interview with Cécile Toubeau, Dir., 
Better Trade & Regulation, Transp. & Env’t (Apr. 23, 2018). 
 71 BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 3, at 1–2 (suggesting possible reforms to the TPF system). 
20 Boston College Law Review (forthcoming 2018) [Vol. 59:1 
 
 
 
increase the number of jurisdictions permitting TPF.72 Moreover, the indus-
try has undertaken an attempt at self-regulation and produced a report (“Re-
port”), sponsored by the International Council for Commercial Arbitration 
and the Queen Mary Law School, which not only fails to recognize ade-
quately the detrimental role of TPF in ISDS, but also seeks to normalize it 
TPF in ISDS and facilitate its increased use.73 Together these efforts create 
serious risks for all stakeholders, and contradict sound public policy. 
A. Regulation Is Not Enough 
Although the Report offers useful recommendations for addressing 
important ethical and professional issues raised by TPF across a range of 
dispute platforms, it almost entirely sidesteps the risk of exploitation of TPF 
in the ISDS system.74 For this reason, the Report risks doing more harm 
than good in the area of investment because it normalizes an exploitative 
practice under the guise of regulating it.75 
The Report adopts a disclosure-based regime with conflict of interest 
rules.76 This is not an unprincipled view in itself and represents an improve-
ment over the status quo. However, given the stakes involved, the exploitative 
nature of TPF in ISDS, and the costs to respondent countries’ taxpayers and 
citizens, it is not enough of a regulatory response. Certainly, it is a step in the 
right direction to know who is exploiting the Great Asymmetry, by how 
much, and for whose benefit, but in light of the fundamental inequities de-
scribed above it is inadequate. By failing to conclusively acknowledge the 
underlying structural risks of TPF in ISDS, the Report amounts to a call for 
regulated exploitation, whatever the bona fides of its authors.77 
Moreover, at a rhetorical and strategic level, the approach of the Report 
itself implies that the presence of TPF in ISDS is beyond regulation or re-
view, that there will be no further public consideration or regulatory response 
except to moderate some of its effects.78 One can see in the careful wording 
                                                                                                                      
 72 Burford Capital, for example, touts its role in lobbying the Hong Kong and Singapore gov-
ernments to relax rules against maintenance and champerty and create TPF opportunities in the 
investment arbitrations they host. 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 11. 
 73 See generally ICCA, REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE, supra note 4. 
 74 See id. at 255–56 (discussing concerns about TPF in an ISDS system). 
 75 See id.  
 76 See id. at 81 (encouraging self-disclosure by parties of TPF, authorizing forced disclosure 
at the direction of the tribunal, and authorizing measures to mitigate conflicts of interest that arise 
as a result of TPF). 
 77 See generally id. 
 78 See id. at 255–56. 
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of Chapter Eight, for example, that the Task Force had to contend with strong 
differences of opinion on this question.79 Nevertheless, there is reason for 
concern that, by its omissions and elisions, the ISDS portions of the Report 
will be read more as a ratification of the status quo with respect to TPF than 
as the opening contribution to a searching and public-minded regulatory con-
versation on TPF and investment arbitration that the Report ostensibly seeks 
to be. 
Thus for the reasons set forth above, and the Report’s recommendations 
notwithstanding, TPF should be barred from all ISDS cases until the system 
is fundamentally reformed both substantively and procedurally. Simple dis-
closure is not an adequate remedy when the structural defects of the system 
are so basic and so prone to exploitation. Allowing TPF to operate within 
ISDS—even under an enhanced disclosure regime—reduces an institution 
designed to protect and incentivize allocations of development capital, ad-
dress injustice (albeit imperfectly), and maintain order, into a speculative in-
vestment opportunity. This is the kind of economic distortion of dispute reso-
lution that traditional prohibitions on maintenance and champerty were de-
signed to prevent. 
This pattern—de-regulating traditional safeguards in order to facilitate 
speculative finance’s exploitation of a substantive regime for extraordinary 
short-term gain—bears an uncomfortable similarity to the regulatory deci-
sions taken in the United States, such as the elimination of the Glass-Steagall 
Act, that gave speculation an increased role in home mortgage finance, creat-
ing tremendous wealth for a few but also unleashing the greatest global eco-
nomic recession since the 1920s.80 Granted, the systemic risks from TPF in 
ISDS may not be as great as the systemic risks created by mortgage-backed 
securities and their relationship to financial derivatives, but for citizens of 
targeted countries the threats to wealth, savings, public goods, and public 
                                                                                                                      
 79 Id. at 199–226. These differing opinions can be seen in an introductory explanation to 
chapter 8:  
One of the primary challenges was linguistic. The language used by different stake-
holders in debates about investment arbitration can be particularly stark. Terminolo-
gy that is part of the basic lexicon of one group of stakeholders is often regarded by 
those with competing views as inherently biased or unduly inflammatory. Despite 
these challenges, this Chapter aims to provide a full-throated presentation of com-
peting viewpoints in a manner that both respects particular stakeholders’ frame of 
reference, but also facilitates meaningful discussion. 
Id. at 199–200. 
 80 KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS 16 (2011) (discussing 
deregulation of the financial industry and its effect on the housing industry). 
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welfare are equally great, as are the uncompensated wealth transfers which 
TPF effects from the needy many to a privileged few. 
Prudent voices have expressed the view that until there is a richer em-
pirical data set on the scale, role, and effect of TPF in ISDS, it would be 
premature to ban or heavily regulate TPF.81 Although this Essay recognizes 
the importance of data-driven regulation, it must also be recognized that the 
scale of current investment, even imperfectly estimated, and the increasing 
rate of TPF funding, suggest strong momentum and powerful financial in-
terests behind increased TPF activity in ISDS.82 Simply put, by the time we 
understand more empirically the full nature of the risks and effects, it may 
be too late to stop TPF. Certainly, many citizens of developing and other 
target countries will have seen public resources intended for their welfare 
diverted into portfolio returns to speculative financiers, at rates as high as 
seven-hundred percent-plus ROI.83 
Under such conditions, it would seem that the precautionary principle, 
an established guideline of international law designed for such situations, 
would support quick action in the face of large-scale and potentially irre-
versible harm to human well-being.84 Essentially, the precautionary princi-
ple reminds regulators that there is a social responsibility to protect the pub-
lic from exposure to harm when a serious substantive investigation has 
                                                                                                                      
 81 See Rachel Denae Thrasher, Expansive Disclosure: Regulating Third-Party Funding for 
Future Analysis and Reform  ¸59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Thrasher, Expan-
sive Disclosure]. 
 82 It is difficult to determine with any precision the exact extent of TPF activity in investment 
arbitration, principally because TPF funders and funded litigants have been loath to disclose the 
presence of TPF and on what terms. There is, however, general consensus even within the arbitral 
community that the TPF presence is significant and increasing. See William Park & Catherine A. 
Rogers, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: The ICCA Queen-Mary Task Force, in 
AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 113, 115 (Christian Klausegger et al. 
eds., 2015) (according to an estimate from a major funder on the Queen Mary Task Force, “at least 
two-thirds of ICSID cases filed in 2013 implicated claimants which had sought resources from a 
major funder”); see also David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community 37 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., 
No. 2012/03, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2207366 (“Commercial 
third party funders generally prefer not to disclose their role to the other parties or to the adjudica-
tors, and funders and parties appear to consider that no clear disclosure requirements currently 
exist. Accordingly, it is not possible to determine the scope of third party funding in ISDS. How-
ever, available evidence suggests an already significant role.”). 
 83 See 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 23 (noting sale of a stake in an arbitration 
claim for 736% ROI). 
 84 See Sonia E. Rolland, Note, The Precautionary Principle: Development of an International 
Standard, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 429, 430 (2002) (explaining the precautionary principle and its 
application in international law). 
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found a plausible risk, and justifies them in exercising discretion to prevent 
such harms even in the face of scientific uncertainty.85 
The well-documented asymmetries in investment treaty law, coupled 
with the clearly “fit-to-purpose” funding model employed by TPF funders, 
amount in this case to the responsible identification of a plausible risk, and 
would in the view of this author justify regulation in the face of a relatively 
less-developed empirical record. That this record is in fact lacking due to 
the deliberate secrecy policies of TPF funders themselves only reinforces 
the urgency and appropriateness of this response. In fact, given that funders 
have the information to reduce such uncertainty but have chosen for self-
interested reasons not to disclose it, the presumption should be that the in-
formation, if disclosed, would raise—not alleviate—concerns about TPF in 
ISDS. It would be a further injustice to allow TPF’s cloaking behavior to 
become the pretext for further delaying regulatory action. 
B. How TPF Could Be Banned 
Banning TPF as a finance mechanism for ISDS would require concert-
ed action in a number of venues and jurisdictions. To begin with, states 
which currently prohibit TPF in their domestic legal systems should main-
tain this ban, at least as far as banning the recognition and enforcement in 
their jurisdictions of TPF-funded investment arbitral awards.86 For example, 
as recently as May 2017, the Supreme Court of Ireland, in Persona Digital 
Telephony Ltd v. Minister for Public Enterprise, confirmed that third party 
funding is prohibited by law due to the violation of the torts of maintenance 
and champerty by TPF.87 States should also make it clear in any subsequent 
or amended BITs that TPF is prohibited from disputes arising under the BIT 
in question. States banning TPF from their jurisdictions would also be in a 
                                                                                                                      
 85 See id. The precautionary principal is defined by the United Nations in the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary ap-
proach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” U.N. Conference on 
Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development princ. 15, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.1), annex 1 (Aug. 12, 1992). 
 86 It would thus be possible for a state to allow TPF in domestic litigation and arbitration 
while banning it in ISDS-related actions. 
 87 Persona Digital Telephony Ltd v. Minister for Public Enterprise [2016] IEHC 187, ¶ 81, 87 
(Ir.). The Court found that it “is clear that the provision of assistance with a view to supporting 
litigation in return for a share of the proceeds in the absence of a bona fide interest is contrary to 
public policy and constitutes an abuse of process.” Id. ¶ 81. 
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position to object to the presence of such funding in any investment arbitra-
tions for which they are the situs. 
States should also seek collective action opportunities to ban TPF. Such 
collective action could include the negotiation of TPF bans in the investment 
chapters of any regional trade agreements they are party to, as well exercising 
their role in arbitral associations such as ICSID and the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to support a TPF ban 
in the arbitral rules of these key associations.88 By acting in concert, states 
could minimize any real or perceived risks of alienating foreign investment or 
investment arbitration business through unilateral bans.89 
Even though the prospects for a multilateral investment treaty (an ideal 
place in which to ban TPF) are not strong, there are important regional trade 
and investment projects currently underway which could also offer im-
portant regulatory opportunities in this regard. For example, as the Europe-
an Union’s leadership on the investment-court model demonstrates, a strong 
and reform-oriented jurisdiction that stands at the hub of a number of in-
vestment treaties can exercise leadership towards creating new paradigms 
through its own treaty practice.90 Moreover, as the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) tax avoidance project illus-
trates, innovative multilateral strategies for coherently amending a multi-
tude of bilateral treaties do exist, which is what the Multilateral Convention 
                                                                                                                      
 88 Efforts are already underway to include TPF in the agenda of the current UNCITRAL and 
ICSID rules reform efforts, in which this author and others have participated. See generally ICSID 
SECRETARIAT, PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENT OF THE ICSID RULES—SYNOPSIS (2018), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/Amendments_Vol_One.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QX5N-KBPK] (outlining proposals for amendments to ICSID’s rules); 
Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, 112 
AM. J. INT’L L. 410, 416–19 (2018); Anthea Roberts & Zeineb Bouraoui, UNCITRAL and ISDS 
Reforms: Concerns about Costs, Transparency, Third Party Funding and Counterclaims, EJIL: 
TALK! (June 6, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-concerns-about-costs-
transparency-third-party-funding-and-counterclaims/ [https://perma.cc/R3PE-BNDV] (summarizing 
different states’ concerns regarding ISDS). 
 89 The Mauritius Convention may also be one such avenue by which states could unilaterally 
ban confidential TPF. G.A. Res. 69/116, United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-
Based Investor-State Arbitration, (Dec. 10, 2014) (establishing rules geared towards increased 
transparency in TPF arbitration). Moreover, clarifying that a state law ban affects only investment 
TPF and not commercial arbitration should allay any fears of alienating commercial arbitration 
business, an important industry for many jurisdictions. 
 90 The EU is developing a proposal for a multi-lateral investment court and has inserted lan-
guage in its recent investment and trade agreements permitting the grafting-in of such an option if 
it is adopted. See The Multilateral Investment Court Project, EUR. COMM’N, http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608 [https://perma.cc/3L7W-CN6V] (outlining the proposal for a 
multilateral investment court). 
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to Implement Tax Treaty-Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (“MLI”) accomplishes in the area of bilateral tax treaties, 
base erosion and profit-shifting.91 
More work needs to be done to develop an effective multi-prong legal 
strategy towards banning TPF in ISDS. Although the legal and practical 
challenges are real, the goal is a worthy one: in law, one does not aim to 
regulate exploitation—one aims to stop it. 
C. Stronger Regulation Is Needed if TPF Is to Be Allowed 
If TPF is to be allowed in ISDS in some form, then ISDS arbitral rules 
should require mandatory, expansive disclosure of third-party funding 
agreements, coupled with mandatory security for costs.92 Although there is 
growing consensus that the existence and identity of a TPF funder should be 
disclosed, such disclosure should go farther and include the terms of fund-
ing agreements.93 This aligns well with general institutional trends toward 
increased transparency and highlights funding agreement provisions that 
create perverse incentives. Such expansive disclosure will also provide the 
much-needed data for future research into the benefits and harms involved 
in TPF and enable more effective regulation going forward. 
Although there is currently no systemic requirement to disclose the 
presence or identity of third-party funders, some promising steps have been 
                                                                                                                      
 91 See generally OECD, MULTILATERAL CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED 
MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING: INFORMATION BROCHURE (2018), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-instrument-BEPS-tax-treaty-information-brochure.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7YNS-J6CW]. The MLI is an innovative multilateral legal instrument to amend 
bilateral income tax treaties in order to implement Base Erosion and Profit Sharing standards 
through a single-instrument unifying framework that offers flexibility to signing countries to: (i) 
identify the treaties they are willing to amend and (ii) identify optional amendments they agree to 
adopt in those treaties they propose to amend, in addition to the minimum standards required by 
the treaty. Id. Over 80 countries have agreed to amend income tax treaties under this instrument 
(subject to individual country ratification procedures), which entered into force on July 1, 2018. 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., SIGNATORIES AND PARTIES TO THE MULTILATERAL 
CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE EROSION AND 
PROFIT SHARING (2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LK79-UVKU]. 
 92 See Rachel Denae Thrasher, The Regulation of Third Party Funding: Gathering Data for 
Future Analysis and Reform 5–6 (B.C. L. Sch. L. & Just. in the Americas Working Paper No. 9, 
2018), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ljawps/9/ [https://perma.cc/4RVC-3NKV] (calling for re-
forms to TPF to provide for more disclosure). 
 93 See generally Thrasher, Expansive Disclosure, supra note 81. 
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taken. The Report, although flawed, does call for limited disclosure.94 On the 
regulatory front, Article 8.26, of the Canada-European Union Trade Agree-
ment includes mandatory disclosure of the presence and identity of TPF fun-
ders, and Article 23(1) of the Singapore Investment Arbitration Commission 
Rules provide the tribunal the discretionary authority to order disclosure of 
the details of the agreement as well.95 The strengths of both of these ap-
proaches should be combined into a single requirement for both mandatory 
and comprehensive disclosure of the presence of TPF and its terms.96 
As an adjunctive strategy to mandatory expansive disclosure, tribunals 
hearing claims involving TPF funding should be empowered to impose 
mandatory security for costs as a matter of course.97 Security for costs or-
ders require the claimant to pay the state’s legal costs in the event the claim 
is denied and can provide a disincentive to funders from pursuing weak cas-
es merely for their settlement or future precedential value. 
CONCLUSION 
It is critically important that states, their negotiators, academics and 
civil society take a careful, transparent, and sustained look at the risks that 
TPF poses to the public and to the investment regime itself. Rather than be 
positioned as a fait accompli, TPF should be properly understood as posing 
exploitation and other risks to the current investment regime, and should be 
eliminated outright while the possibility still exists. If, however, TPF is to 
be allowed, for example in order to permit data collection towards future 
regulation, it should be restricted by the constraints outlined above and oth-
ers yet to be formulated. 
                                                                                                                      
 94 ICCA, REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 81 (calling for 
limited disclosure of third-party funding). 
 95 See Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. 8.26, Oct. 30, 2016, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H53-E2SL] 
(providing “[w]here there is third party funding, the disputing party benefiting from it shall disclose to 
the other disputing party and to the Tribunal the name and address of the third party funder”); SIAC, 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION RULES OF THE SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE 12 
art. 23(1) (1st ed. 2017), http://www.siac.org.sg/images/stories/articles/rules/IA/SIAC%20Investment
%20Arbitration%20Rules%20-%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG7M-DS2S] (providing that 
“[u]nless otherwise agreed by the Parties, the Tribunal may . . . require a Party to give any expert 
appointed under Rule 23.1(a) any relevant information, or to produce or provide access to any rele-
vant documents, goods or property for inspection”). 
 96 Thrasher, supra note 92, at 7–8. 
 97 An example of this would be the arguments in favor of this approach made by Gavan Grif-
fith, arbitrator in the RSM case. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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It is important to recognize, however, that the benefits of regulating 
towards disclosure and further data collection come at the cost of accepting 
in the meantime a rapidly growing TPF presence in ISDS and foregoing the 
broad systemic benefits of a TPF ban. This could make it difficult if not im-
possible to effectively regulate TPF down the road. The risk we undertake is 
to look back at this moment as we do to the run-up to the 2008 financial 
crisis, as a story of opportunities missed at the cost of suffering unleashed. 
